预约转让定价的博弈分析  

Dice game analysis of reservation alienation pricing

作　　者：杜欣[1] 

机构地区：[1]暨南大学经济学院,广东广州510632

出　　处：《特区经济》2010年第2期301-302,共2页Special Zone Economy

摘　　要：国际关联交易中,跨国公司常常根据各国税制差异利用转让定价套取税收利益,逃避税收。我国作为吸引外国直接投资最多的国家之一,也面临由此产生的税收大量流失的严重问题。本文通过构建预约定价中参与人之间的博弈模型,对其进行分析,提出相应措施,对进一步完善反避税制度具有重要意义。In international transactions, multinational corporation make use of the different transfer pricing system to obtain tax benefits and evade tax. As one of the countries which attract most foreign direct investment, China face the serious problems which resulting huge loss of revenue. In this paper, by establishing the game theory model for parties involved in the Advance Pricing Agreement and analysis thereof, this article shows the features of the negotiated pricing arrangement so as to search for better ways of anti-tax evasion.

关 键 词：预约转让定价 完全信息动态博弈模型 

分 类 号：F276.7[经济管理—企业管理]