装备采办项目招投标中的水平串标及其防范  

Horizontal Collusive Bidding and Collusion-proof Measures in Equipment Acquisition

作　　者：李继业[1] 吴鸣[1] 

机构地区：[1]国防科技大学人文与社会科学学院

出　　处：《装备指挥技术学院学报》2010年第1期23-26,共4页Journal of the Academy of Equipment Command & Technology

摘　　要：在建立信息有限对称基准模型的基础上，逐步放松假设条件，利用博弈论思想分析了装备采办项目招投标中影响水平串标的各种因素发挥作用的路径，指出了研制价格再谈判对水平串标的影响，探讨了在装备采办中防范水平串标的措施。On the basis of bench mark model of limited symmetric information and with the help of Game Theory thought, the paper loosens the hypothesis terms step by step, analyzes the role of those factors that have influence on the horizontal collusive bidding in equipment acquisition, points out the impact of price renegotiation on horizontal collusive bidding,and discusses the collusion-proof measures from several angles.

关 键 词：水平串标 装备采办 价格再谈判 

分 类 号：F014.36[经济管理—政治经济学]