可想象性论证及其问题——评查尔莫斯的认知二维语义学  

On Chalmers' Conceivability Argument Based on Two-dimensional Semantics

作　　者：魏屹东[1] 陈敬坤[1] 

机构地区：[1]山西大学科学技术哲学研究中心/哲学社会学学院,太原030006

出　　处：《科学技术哲学研究》2010年第1期33-39,91,共8页Studies in Philosophy of Science and Technology

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地重大攻关项目"语境实在论"(07JJD20051);山西省教育厅课题"语境实在论与认知科学的发展"(20083002);山西省留学项目"科学认知的机制与表征模型研究"(0905502)

摘　　要：可想象性论证是心灵哲学中的一个重要问题。传统的可想象论证集中于物理主义与反物理主义之争,但没有达成一致意见。查尔莫斯运用二维语义学对传统的可想象性论证进行了修正,重建了可想象性与可能性之间的联系。我们发现查尔莫斯并没有真正解决这个问题,他的论证仍然有缺陷,并不能真正驳倒物理主义。In the contemporary philosophy of mind,a number of popular arguments against physicalism conclude that there is an ontological gap between physical process and consciousness just like the epistemic gap between physical truths and phenomenal truths,but physicalists hold that the epistemic premises do not entail ontological conclusion.By virtue of two-dimensional semantics and rebuilding the bridge between conceivability and possibility,Chalmers improves the traditional conceivability argument and argues that the inference from epistemic premises to ontological conclusion is reasonable.This is a real challenge for physicalism,but this paper argues that,with some deficiencies,the improved conceivability argument cannot actually confute physicalism.

关 键 词：查尔莫斯 可想象性论证 CP论题 二维语义学 

分 类 号：N02[自然科学总论—科学技术哲学]