激励合约线性结构的行为合约理论解释  

A Theoretical Explanation to Linearity of Incentive Contract Based on Behavioral Contract Theory

作　　者：魏光兴[1] 覃燕红[1] 

机构地区：[1]重庆交通大学管理学院,重庆400074

出　　处：《管理科学》2010年第1期75-80,共6页Journal of Management Science

基　　金：国家社会科学基金(07XJL004)~~

摘　　要：合约理论继承了经济学传统自利偏好假设,却忽略了公平偏好等行为心理因素。为此,在借鉴行为经济学描述公平偏好的FS模型基础上,把公平偏好引入最优激励合约设计的标准框架,以行为合约理论为工具,通过建立离散产出和离散努力模型,研究设计公平偏好下的最优激励合约。分析结果发现,引入公平偏好之后的一级最优和二级最优激励合约都是线性结构的,并且其斜率会随着公平偏好增强而增大,但不会超过0.5。这不但得到了线性结构的激励合约,而且得到了与实证研究结论相一致的关于激励合约斜率性质的理论分析结果,从而为激励合约线性结构提供了一种较合理的理论解释。Although contract theory has been developing rapidly and been applied to many fields widely, it has never explained well why most practical incentive contracts are linear. An important reason is that contract theory adopts the traditional economic assumption of self-interest ignoring some behavioral psychological preferences such as inequity aversion. By incorporating inequity aversion into the standard frame of optimal contract design on the base of FS model which describes inequity aversion in behavioral economics, with the approach of behavioral contract theory this paper develops a model of discrete output and effort to investigate the optimal incentive contract under inequity aversion. The results suggest that the first best and the second best optimal contract under inequity aversion are both linear, whose slope increases with the strength of inequity aversion, but not more than the upper limit 0. 5. It provides a rational theoretical explanation to linearity of contract because it not only obtains the linear contract but also achieves the theoretic results which are consistent with the findings of empirical researches on the slope of linear contract.

关 键 词：激励合约 公平偏好 线性合约 行为合约理论 行为经济学 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济]