工分制下农民与干部的行为选择  

Behavior Choices of Peasants and Cadres Under the Workpoint System

作　　者：吴淼[1] 

机构地区：[1]华中科技大学公共管理学院,副教授武汉430074

出　　处：《中共党史研究》2010年第2期36-45,共10页CPC History Studies

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地重大项目<当代中国农村变迁的政策话语与关键词研究>(2009JJD840005)的阶段性研究成果

摘　　要：在人民公社体制下,作为农业人力资源配置机制的工分制,直接决定着农村生产者和管理者的行为选择,进而影响大集体生产的绩效和乡村社会秩序。随着工分制的不断完善和精细化,农业生产不断发展,在一定程度上缓和了集体化固有的矛盾;但是,面对中国农业生产的低水平和复杂性,仍难以消除农民的策略性行为,使得集体生产管理异常艰难,反过来导致家庭间、干群间矛盾不断积聚。最终,工分制的完善只能以人民公社体制的瓦解来实现。Under the people＇ s commune system, as a mechanism of human resource allocation in agriculture the workpoint system directly determined the behavior choices of rural producers and managers and affected the performance of large collective production and rural social order. With the continuous improvement and refinement of the workpoint system, the agricultural production steadily developed and mitigated, to some extent, the contradictions inherent in the collectivization. However, in face of the low level and complexities of agricultural production in China, It could not eliminate the producers＇ tactical behaviors. The management of eollective production was made very difficult, which in turn continuously increased and aggravated contradictions among households and between cadres and commune members. At last, the process of improvement of workpoint system could only end in the disintegration of the people＇ s commune system.

关 键 词：工分制 评工议分 抢工挣分 排工派活 

分 类 号：F320[经济管理—产业经济]