生命周期视角下的股权制衡与企业价值  

Firm Life-cycles,Power Balance and Corporate Value

作　　者：佟岩[1] 陈莎莎[2] 

机构地区：[1]北京理工大学管理与经济学院 [2]北京大学深圳研究生院汇丰商学院

出　　处：《南开管理评论》2010年第1期108-115,共8页Nankai Business Review

摘　　要：本文将企业生命周期作为约束条件纳入股权制衡与企业价值的关系分析。在划分上市公司企业生命周期和最终控制人性质的基础上,匹配2004-2006年符合股权制衡与一股独大条件的对应样本,考察股权制衡和一股独大的股权安排模式与企业价值的关系。研究发现,处于成熟期时,股权制衡的上市公司企业价值显著高于一股独大的上市公司企业价值。由于未获得成熟期的民营企业样本,因此成熟期最终控制人性质对企业价值的影响差异无法验证。处于成长期时,一股独大的上市公司企业价值均值高于股权制衡的上市公司企业价值,但在统计上并不显著。而且在成长期最终控制人性质并未显著影响制衡与否与企业价值的关系。During the different stage of life-cycle, one company must make lots of decisions and deal with various business problems. A suitable ownership structure will be great help for better decisions and execution, which then result in maximization of corporate value. But there is no such an ownership structure, even power balance, which could suit for all the four stages： the start-up stage, the growth stage, the mature stage and the decline stage. For Chinese companies, shareholder＇s character, state owned or private controlled, is also an important factor which will have serious impact on corporate management. In the case of division of listed companies＇ life-cycle and ultimate controller, this paper focuses on the relationship between power balance and corporate value of listed companies. Because our sample is consisted of listed companies in the main board of the stock market in China, there is no company in the start-up stage. We delete companies in the decline stage during the sample selection. We map the corresponding samples of companies with power balance and those dominated by a single stockholder from 2004 to 2006, then, try to inspect the different relationship between the corporate value and the two stockholder＇s rights arrangement patterns. The results of main and robust tests both show that the power balance ownership structure can significantly promote corporate value of listed companies in mature period. We could not give evidence on the impact of character of ultimate controller on corporate value due to missing data of private controlled companies. The corporate value of the listed companies with one dominant shareholder is higher than those of power balance companies in growth period. However, the difference is not significant. At the same time, the character of ultimate controller has no remarkable effect on the relationship between power balance and corporate value in growth period.

关 键 词：股权制衡 企业价值 企业生命周期 最终控制人 

分 类 号：F270[经济管理—企业管理]