基于溢出效益的研发联盟利润分配设计  

Profit Distribution Design of R&D Alliance Base on Spillover Benefit

作　　者：孟卫东[1] 马国旺[1] 黄波[1] 

机构地区：[1]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆400044

出　　处：《科技进步与对策》2010年第6期99-103,共5页Science & Technology Progress and Policy

基　　金：教育部高等学校博士学科点基金项目(200806110003)

摘　　要：研究了如何利用利益分配方式作为激励机制,促使研发联盟成员放弃投机行为(即道德风险);对Shapley值法进行修正并以此为分配依据,设计出研发联盟的利润分配机制,以此激励联盟成员自动选择联盟最优投资策略作为自己的研发投资策略;通过理论及数值仿真算例分析证明,采用修正的Shapley值法进行利润分配,能够实现防范道德风险,促进合作研发的成功。It is studied how to use profit distribution arrangement as an incentive mechanism to promote the members of R＆D alliance to give up opportunism. The profit distribution mechanism is designed, which is based on modified Shapley Value method, as a result, members of R＆D alliance are stimulated to choose the optimal strategy of alliance as theirs. It is proved by theoretic and numerical analysis that adopting modified Shapley value method can prevent moral hazard and make cooperative R＆D a success.

关 键 词：SHAPLEY值 研发联盟 道德风险 利润分配 激励机制 

分 类 号：G301[文化科学]