中国住房市场广告的信号传递  

Advertising signaling in China's housing market

作　　者：林荫[1] 张红[1] 

机构地区：[1]清华大学建设管理系,北京100084

出　　处：《清华大学学报（自然科学版）》2010年第3期474-476,共3页Journal of Tsinghua University(Science and Technology)

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70673050)

摘　　要：为了分析广告信号对中国住房交易过程的影响,该文基于信号传递理论,建立住房一级市场的广告信号传递模型,寻找将广告真实程度与开发企业收益一致化、提高信号传递有效性的机制。研究结果表明:中国住房一级市场中开发企业的广告信号发送强度受到住房质量、企业管理水平和品牌价值等因素的影响。建议采取行政措施对广告宣传力度和住房质量进行规定,激励开发企业主动发送真实信号,以便有效甄别不同质量的住房,从而降低住房市场的交易信息成本。An advertising signaling model was developed to analyze the effect of advertising signals on housing transactions in China＇s newly-built housing market based on signaling theory. A mechanism was found to match a developers＇ benefits with their advertising credibility to improve the effectiveness of their signaling transmissions. The results indicate that the developers＇ advertising signaling in the newly-built housing market is related with the housing quality, enterprise management, and brand value. Administrative efforts should be related to advertising impact and housing quality to encourage developers to send real signals to distinguish houses with different qualities to reduce the information cost.

关 键 词：住房市场 广告 信号传递模型 信息不对称 

分 类 号：F293.35[经济管理—国民经济]