管理者过度自信与企业并购行为的实证研究  

An Empirical Study on the Relationship between Managerial Overconfidence and Corporate Mergers and Acquisitions

作　　者：史永东[1,2] 朱广印[3] 

机构地区：[1]东北财经大学 [2]浙江财经学院 [3]东北财经大学应用金融研究中心和金融学院

出　　处：《金融评论》2010年第2期73-82,38,共11页Chinese Review of Financial Studies

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(70671019;70871019);教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地中国人民大学应用统计科学研究中心重大项目(06JJD910002);辽宁省教育厅创新团队项目(2006T042);教育部新世纪优秀人才项目(NCET-06-0294);辽宁省优秀人才项目(2006R19);北京大学汇丰金融研究院对外公开招标项目

摘　　要：基于企业理论和财务理论,本文从行为公司金融视角对我国上市公司管理者过度自信和企业并购行为之间的关系进行了实证检验。通过2006～2008年间沪、深两市上市公司并购行为的实证研究,发现管理者过度自信是企业并购行为的重要动力和原因,企业并购政策和管理者过度自信之间存在显著的正相关关系,过度自信企业实施的并购行为比非过度自信企业高20%左右;而内部治理结构和企业的并购决策之间不存在显著的相关关系。过度自信管理者相信自己是忠于股东的,但是却可能做出损害公司利益的决策;标准的激励合约无法解决这一问题。独立董事可能需要在项目评估和选择管理层方面发挥更为积极和有效的作用。Based on the theory of the firm and financial theory,the paper acts an empirical test of the relationship between the managerial overconfidence and the mergers and acquisitions activity from the perspective of behavioral corporate finance.Through the empirical studies on mergers and acquisitions of Shanghai and Shenzhen listed companies in 2006～2008 years,we find that managerial overconfidence is an important driving force for merger and acquisition activity.There is a significant positive correlation between the managerial overconfidence and M&A activity.The M&A activities in corporate with overconfident managers are about 20% higher than in corporate without overconfident managers.There is no significant correlation between the internal governance structure and corporate mergers and acquisitions decision-making.Overconfident managers believe they are faithful to shareholders,but they maybe make some decisions harmful.Thus,the standard incentive contract cannot correct their sub-optimal decisions.The independent directors maybe should play a more active and effective role in project evaluating and managers selecting.

关 键 词：行为公司金融 管理者过度自信 并购行为 

分 类 号：F272[经济管理—企业管理] F271[经济管理—国民经济]