供应链中信用交易的演化博弈分析  

Analysis of Credit Trade Evolutionary Game in Supply Chain

作　　者：刘涛[1,2] 李帮义[1] 孙涛[1] 

机构地区：[1]南京航空航天大学经济管理学院,南京210016 [2]河南商业高等专科学校工商管理系,郑州450045

出　　处：《管理评论》2010年第3期115-121,共7页Management Review

基　　金：教育部人文社科基金(07JA630039)

摘　　要：本文运用演化博弈理论研究了供应链中信用交易的演化过程,建立了供应商和零售商信用交易的演化博弈模型。分析了两类个体在守信与失信两种策略下的行为特征,根据复制者动态方程得到了两者的行为演化规律和政府失信惩罚机制下的行为演化和演化稳定策略,给出了从根本上消灭失信动机的惩罚区间,分析了政府失信惩罚机制的有效性,探寻国内信用制度建设的发展路径。最后,通过数值分析证明了结论的正确性。This paper studies the credit trade evolutionary game in supply chain and establishes an evolutionary game model for the credit trade of suppliers and retailers. It finds the evolution law and develops an evolutionary stabilization strategy under punishment mechanism of government against deception according to analysis of supplier and retailer behavior characteristics under strategy of keeping faith or break faith through dynamic equation. Furthermore,it presents elimination motivational interval fundamentally and analysis of the effectiveness of punishment mechanism of government against deception and explores the development path of domestic credit system. In the end,this paper proves the conclusion through numerical examples.

关 键 词：信用交易 演化博弈 演化稳定策略 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理] F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]