产能预定合同下代工厂商的产能扩充与转包策略  

Research on OEM's Capacity Expansion and Subcontracting Strategy with Capacity Reservation Contract

作　　者：夏海洋[1] 黄培清[2] 

机构地区：[1]华东理工大学商学院,上海200237 [2]上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院,上海200052

出　　处：《系统管理学报》2010年第1期56-61,共6页Journal of Systems & Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70772065);国家自然科学基金青年项目(70902072)

摘　　要：考虑一个设计厂商和一个代工厂商构成的两级供应链系统,并且存在外部代工厂商,设计厂商可以购买即时产能,而代工厂商可以实行转包时,在产能预定合同下,设计厂商和代工厂商的最优策略。结果表明,当产能预定费用增加时,设计厂商将减少最优的产能预定量,代工厂商的产能扩充系数则会提升;如果产能需求市场前景看好,设计厂商将增加其产能预定数量,此时虽然代工厂商的产能扩充系数变化不明确,但其产能扩充水平将增加。This paper considers a two-stage supply chain system comprising of a design firm and an OEM.We analyze the design firm and the OEM＇s optimal strategy when external OEMs exist.So in addition to reservation capacity from the OEM,the design firm can also acquire capacity from external OEMs,and also the OEM can subcontract the product manufacturing to external OEMs.Our results show that when capacity reservation price increases,the design firm＇s optimal reservation amount will decrease,on the other hand the OEM＇s capacity expansion index will increase.When the possibility of capacity demand increases,the design firm will increase its capacity reservation amount,and the OEM will increase capacity expansion amount,while the change of OEM＇s capacity expansion index is ambiguous.

关 键 词：产能预定合同 产能扩充 转包 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]