认证的可靠性:质量标志是消费者的政策工具  

The Reliability of Certification: Quality Labels as a Consumer Policy Tool

作　　者：朱彧[1] 邓少军 樊红平[1] Gabriele Jahn Matthias Schramm Achim Spiller 

机构地区：[1]农业部农产品质量安全中心,北京100081 [2]中非发展基金,北京100031 [3]The Institute of Agricultural Economics,University of Goettingen

出　　处：《中国农学通报》2010年第7期55-63,共9页Chinese Agricultural Science Bulletin

摘　　要：目前在食品行业中存在数量众多的认证体系,但是与认证的经济学研究却很少。认证是在市场交易中可确保商品某种隐藏质量声明真实性的有效工具。在信息不对称的情况下,诸如有机生产、动物福利、公平贸易等"过程导向"的品质特性容易产生不正当使用标志问题。从长远来看,只有可靠的控制程序才能减少食品安全事件的发生。首先提出了一个影响认证结果和认证标志有效性的模型,然后探讨了认证市场价格战的趋势和认证制度变革的必要性,提出了减少对检查员的依赖程度、强化职责、增加公信力效应和降低认证费用等策略,最后讨论了对官方和非官方监管的政策内涵。Given the large number of certification systems in the food industry, it is surprising that there are only a few research approaches to the economics of certification. Certification schemes are used to ensure marketing claims for unobservable quality attributes. Under asymmetric information, process-oriented quality characteristics such as organic farming, animal welfare, or fair trade raise the question of mislabeling. In the long run, only a reliable control procedure can reduce the risk of food scandals. The article presents a model which includes several starting points to enhance the efficiency of certification systems and the corresponding labels. On the whole, tendencies towards price wars on the certification market and considerable differences in performance reveal the necessity of institutional changes. Strategies for reducing auditors’dependence, intensifying liability, increasing reputation effects, and minimizing audit costs are suggested. Finally, policy implications for public and private monitoring are discussed.

关 键 词：认证 质量标志 政策工具 

分 类 号：TS207.7[轻工技术与工程—食品科学]