基于过度自信的双边道德风险规避问题  

Study on Double Moral Hazard Prevention Based on Overconfidence

作　　者：刘新民[1] 温新刚[1] 吴士健[1] 

机构地区：[1]山东科技大学经济管理学院,山东青岛266510

出　　处：《上海交通大学学报》2010年第3期373-377,共5页Journal of Shanghai Jiaotong University

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70971078);教育部人文社会科学研究一般规划项目(09YJA630089);山东科技大学研究生创新基金(YCA090321)

摘　　要：将过度自信、解聘补偿和代理人的解聘倾向引入委托代理关系,进行合同的重新设计,通过数理推导,分析过度自信对于努力水平、激励系数、固定报酬和代理成本的影响,建立了基于代理人过度自信的双边道德风险缓解机制,同时可以解决委托人激励代理人为实现企业利益而努力工作的激励效率低下问题.The traditional principal-agent model does not fully consider the irrational behaviors and the effect of psychological factors of the principal and agent,nor resolves the double moral hazard problem such as the adverse selection. This paper introduced the overconfidence,the dismissal compensation and the principal＇s dismissal liability into the principal-agent model,redesigned the contract,analyzed the effect of（overconfidence） on the effort level,incentive coefficient,fixed compensation and the agency cost through mathematical deduction,and set up the double moral hazard prevention mechanism based on the（agent＇s） （overconfidence,） which can also resolve the low incentive efficiency to encourage the agents to work hard for the principal＇s interests.

关 键 词：过度自信 解聘补偿 解聘倾向 双边道德风险 

分 类 号：F271[经济管理—企业管理]