监管、多重代理与商业银行治理的最优激励契约设计  

Regulation,Multitask-Principal-Agent and Optimal Incentive Contract Design on Commercial Bank Governance

作　　者：蒋海[1] 朱滔[1] 李东辉[2] 

机构地区：[1]暨南大学金融研究所,510632 [2]澳大利亚新南威尔士大学

出　　处：《经济研究》2010年第4期40-53,共14页Economic Research Journal

基　　金：教育部人文社科基金(编号08JA790056);广东省社科基金(编号07E04);教育部留学回国人员启动基金的资助

摘　　要：因受到严格监管,商业银行的治理机制和激励契约设计与一般企业存在明显差异。近年来我国银行治理机制得到了较大改善,但仍然存在激励约束机制不健全等诸多问题。本文从银行治理特征入手,归纳抽象出银行治理中两个最主要特征:多重委托代理和多任务性,并在Holmstrom&Milgrom(1991)模型框架下,揭示商业银行最优激励契约均衡条件,同时进一步探讨了我国上市银行的最优激励契约设计问题。结果表明,目前上市银行普遍建立起了与银行经营业绩相关联的薪酬激励制度,但监管当局尚未建立起与风险控制相联系的正向和负向激励约束机制,这样的薪酬契约安排可能导致高管将过多精力放在经营业绩上,而忽视对银行风险控制的努力。The governance mechanism and incentive contract design of commercial banks are distinctly different from ecumenical enterprises due to strictly regulated by government. Governance mechanism of commercial banks has improved recently in China, but their incentive and constraint systems are still not reasonable. This paper abstracts two prominent characteristics from the ordinary specialties on commercial banks governance： multi-principal agent and muhitask, then establishes a multitask-muhi- principal agent model based on Holmstrom and Milgrom＇ s initial research to analyze the optimal incentive contract design on commercial banks. The empirical results support the hypothesis that compensational incentive mechanism associating with financial performance of commercial bank has set up but the incentive mechanism relating to risk control not yet in Chinese banking system. Tbus current incentive contract design on commercial banks in China could induce top-managers to put more effort on financial performance and less effort on risk management.

关 键 词：商业银行 监管 委托代理 薪酬激励 

分 类 号：F832.2[经济管理—金融学]