内部控制、治理环境与投资者保护  

Internal Control,Institutional Environment and Investor Protection

作　　者：杨德明[1] 林斌[2] 任英[3] 

机构地区：[1]华南理工大学工商管理学院,广东广州510641 [2]中山大学管理学院,广东广州510275 [3]云南财经大学会计学院,云南昆明650221

出　　处：《证券市场导报》2010年第4期53-60,共8页Securities Market Herald

基　　金：国家自然基金项目(70802024);华南理工大学学生研究计划(B16-Y1090150)资助

摘　　要：本文研究了内部控制质量对投资者保护的影响,以及不同治理环境对内部控制治理功能的影响。研究发现:内部控制质量的提高,或更为充分的内控信息披露有助于抑制大股东资金占用,有助于抑制经理人与股东之间的代理成本;治理环境越差的地区,内部控制治理效应越高。这说明,对于投资者保护较弱的地区,内部控制可能成为补偿弱投资者保护负面影响的一种替代机制。本文研究意味着,近年来推出的内部控制相关制度起到了积极的效果;此外,完善上市公司内部控制,对于治理环境较差、投资者利益得不到有效保障的地区显得尤为重要。Our paper studies how the quality of internal control affects the protection of investors, and how the institutional environment affects the governance function of internal control. Our research finds that high quality internal control or full information disclosure can restrain large shareholders＇ fund occupation and the agency cost between managers and the shareholders. Our research also finds the worse institutional environment, the better governance function of internal control. This means the high quality internal control could mitigate the negative effect of weak investor protection. We can draw the conclusion that the system of internal control has played an active role, and improving the internal control of listed companies is even more important for the area of bad institutional environment and weak investor protection.

关 键 词：内部控制 治理环境 投资者保护 公司治理 

分 类 号：F830.91[经济管理—金融学]