声誉效应对联盟伙伴道德风险行为约束的博弈分析  

Game Analysis on Reputation Effects Restricting the Alliance Partners's Moral Hazard Behavior

作　　者：符加林[1] 

机构地区：[1]郑州轻工业学院经济与管理学院,河南郑州450002

出　　处：《华东经济管理》2010年第4期153-155,共3页East China Economic Management

基　　金：郑州轻工业学院博士科研基金;河南省政府决策招标课题(B501)

摘　　要：在重复博弈及信息充分传递的情况下,声誉效应可以成为一种影响行为主体行动选择的激励机制。基于古诺博弈模型的扩展分析表明,不考虑声誉时,战略联盟中的企业具有很强的道德风险等机会主义行为倾向,联盟伙伴间的博弈会陷入囚徒困境,并使得联盟走向解体。但重复博弈时声誉效应会起到积极作用,对联盟中的企业道德风险行为产生有效约束。In repeated games and the enough transfer of information, the reputation effect can be an incentive mechanism to affect people＇ s choice of action . The expansion of analysis based on Cournot game model showed that regardless of reputation, the enterprises be- long to a strategic alliance have a strong tendency of the risk of opportunistic behavior, and the coalition partners would be in a Prisoner＇s Dilemma game, and made the alliance disintegrate. However, when the game is repeated, reputation effect will play an active role and bring effective constraint on the moral hazard of enterprise in the alliance.

关 键 词：声誉效应 联盟伙伴 道德风险 约束 

分 类 号：F271[经济管理—企业管理]