博弈论视角下的员工援助计划(EAP)策略研究  

Strategy Research on Employee Assistance Program(EAP)in the Perspective of Game Theory

作　　者：黄燕[1] 任怡菲[1] 

机构地区：[1]汕头大学商学院,汕头515063

出　　处：《价值工程》2010年第11期50-51,共2页Value Engineering

基　　金：2009汕头市科技计划项目"基于顾客导向的企业自主创新模式研究"(152)

摘　　要：2010年伊始,中国东部沿海和部分内陆省份再度出现"用工荒",为了缓解劳资矛盾,提高企业效率,员工帮助计划(Employee Assistance Program,简称EAP)提上日程。在希望能更好的引导企业实施EAP的前提下,文章采用博弈论的方法从企业实施EAP障碍角度入手,分析了在完全市场环境与政府参与环境下企业实施EAP的行为与策略进行,得出政府的参与下能够使企业改变自身策略主动选择实施EAP。In the beginning of 2010, ＂labor shortage＂ phenomenon re-emerged in some provinces in eastern coast and some inland areas. In order to relieve conflicts between labor and management and improve corporate efficiency, EAP is put on the agenda. In the hope to guide enterprises to implement EAP effectively, this article uses the method of Game Theory to analyze different behavior for a company to implement EAP in the circumstance of completely market-oriented and in circumstance of government participation. Conclude that enterprise will change their strategy and take initiative to implement EAP when governments participate.

关 键 词：员工帮助计划(EAP) 博弈 政府参与 

分 类 号：F272.9[经济管理—企业管理]