新员工培训的契约设计及其激励机制  

Incentive Mechanism Design of the Training Contracts of New Employees

作　　者：谢文昕[1] 李嫣[1] 李克强[1] 周亚[1] 

机构地区：[1]北京师范大学管理学院系统科学系,北京100875

出　　处：《河南师范大学学报（自然科学版）》2010年第2期31-34,共4页Journal of Henan Normal University(Natural Science Edition)

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(77771012);2004年教育部重大课题(04JZD0023)

摘　　要：通过建立委托—代理模型,依据机制设计和激励相容原理,研究企业对新员工进行培训时如何对具有不同跳槽风险的员工进行甄别.得到的次优契约表明,实施有区别的培训合同能够有效避免培训后员工跳槽造成的损失.Through the establishment of principal-agent model,mechanism design and incentive compatibility principle are used to analyze how to distinguish new employees with different risk of job-hopping before training them. The second optimal contract mechanism indicates that different training contracts can effectively prevent post-training losses caused by employee turnover.

关 键 词：委托-代理模型 激励相容 信息租金 道德风险 

分 类 号：F272.92[经济管理—企业管理]