股权结构与企业技术创新动力——基于双重代理理论的上市公司实证研究  

Ownership Structure and Technical Innovation Dynamic——An Empirical Study of Listed Companies Based on Double Principal-Agent Theory

作　　者：刘渐和[1] 王德应[1] 

机构地区：[1]安徽财经大学管理学院,安徽蚌埠233041

出　　处：《西安财经学院学报》2010年第3期88-93,共6页Journal of Xi’an University of Finance & Economics

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金(07JA630035);安徽省2008年度高校自然科学研究项目(KJ2008B136)

摘　　要：文章基于双重代理理论,以2007年中小企业板披露研发数据的86家上市公司为研究样本,对股权结构与企业技术创新动力关系进行实证研究。研究发现,在控制了其他因素的影响后:(1)股权集中度与技术创新动力有显著的正相关关系,而第一大股东持股与技术创新动力有负相关关系;(2)股权制衡与技术创新动力有负相关关系,即第二大股东持股不利于企业技术创新;(3)高管—股东代理削弱了股权结构对企业技术创新动力的影响。Based on double principal-agent theory, the paper uses a sample of 86 small and medium-sized listed companies that have disclosed R＆D expenditures in annual reports of 2007 and investigates the relation between corporate ownership structure and the dynamic of technical innovation. After controlling other factors＇ effects, we find that （i）concentration ownership has a significant positive effect on the dynamic of technical innovation, while the largest shareholder＇s share proportion has a negative effect on it; （ ii ）check-and-balance ownership＇s effect on the dynamic of technical innovation is negative too, which means the second shareholder＇s share proportion is bad to technical innovation; （ iii ）manager-shareholder＇s principal-agent moderate the relation between corporate ownership structure and the dynamic of technical innovation negatively.

关 键 词：技术创新动力 股权集中 股权制衡 双重代理理论 

分 类 号：F276.6[经济管理—企业管理]