基于商业银行内在脆弱性的公司治理安排  

作　　者：杨宏斌[1] 

机构地区：[1]成都信息工程学院商学院,四川成都610225

出　　处：《特区经济》2010年第4期79-82,共4页Special Zone Economy

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地重大项目(08JJDGJW259)资助

摘　　要：商业银行公司治理与普通企业公司治理相比具有特殊性。商业银行经营的特性决定了其治理目标应该包括保护所有者、投资者(储户)、企业的相关利益。商业银行藉以存在的储蓄合约挤兑激励和贷款合约内生的银行和企业目标的不一致性决定了商业银行内在脆弱性,储蓄合约和贷款合约的不完全性决定了商业银行有必要进行公司治理,为了完善商业银行公司治理机制,有必要从外部机制的健全入手,包括信息透明制度、存款保险制度、道德风险防范等。Compared with the enterprise, there is spe cial in the corporate governance of the commercial banks. The special features of the commercial bank decides that the corporate governance goal of commercial bank should protect the benefit of the respects composed of the owners, all the investors （deposits） and the enterprises. The commercial bank run on the deposit and loan contract. The run inspiring of the deposit contract and the interior goal-difference in bank and enterprise of the loan contract decide the endogenizative fragility of the commercial bank, the incomplete character of the deposit and loan contracts makes corporate governance necessary, To improve the corporate governance structure of commercial bank, it is necessary to improve the exterior mechanism including information disclose policy, deposit saving policy and moral risk protect.

关 键 词：商业银行 公司治理 储蓄合约 贷款合约 外部机制 

分 类 号：F830.33[经济管理—金融学]