不完全监管下股市投机性的博弈均衡与演化动态  

A Study on the Game Equilibrium of Speculative Behaviors and Its Evolution Dynamics under Incomplete Stock Market Regulation

作　　者：余向华[1] 胡平[2] 陈雪娟[3] 

机构地区：[1]北京工商大学经济学院,北京100037 [2]中国人民银行金融稳定局,北京100800 [3]中国社会科学院经济研究所,北京100836

出　　处：《南方金融》2010年第4期71-77,共7页South China Finance

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(项目编号:70972063)的资助

摘　　要：股市的整体表现是众多市场主体间博弈互动的结果。本文以作为股市最终供求主体的股民和上市公司间的博弈为着眼点,通过静态与演化动态分析相结合,探讨了在不同监管情况下,股市中投机性状况作为博弈均衡结果出现的条件,各均衡结果如何随时间推进和制度完善而演化。结论表明,在不同监管完备程度下,股民的投机性与上市公司的投机性相互影响,而是否会形成整体层面的投机性均衡以及这种均衡如何演化,则与初始状态和监管完备程度有关。The games between the agents in stock market produce the performance of stock market. Based on an analyze of the game between the representative stockholder and the representative listed enterprises, this paper explores the requiremenl of speculativeness as a game equilibrium result under different degree of regulation maturity, and the evolution of equilibrium by improvement of institution over time. It concludes that speculative behaviors interact among different agents, and whether it will reach global speculativeness equilibrium and how it evolves in stock market depends on its initial state and maturity of regulation.

关 键 词：股市投机性 博弈均衡 演化动态 监管 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]