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作 者:赵玉亮[1]
机构地区:[1]南开大学公司治理研究中心/南开大学商学院,天津300071
出 处:《山西财经大学学报》2010年第5期49-55,共7页Journal of Shanxi University of Finance and Economics
基 金:国家自然科学基金面上项目(70972086);国家自然科学基金面上项目(70672029);国家旅游局项目(09TAAG008);天津市科技发展战略研究计划项目(09ZLZLZT02400)
摘 要:中国企业改革的过程是企业治理模式从行政型治理向经济型治理演变的过程,即行政型治理弱化、经济型治理逐步强化的过程。本文针对行政型治理的表现(即资源配置行政化、经营目标行政化和人事任命行政化三个方面)提出5个相关假设,运用2006~2008年沪深两市1187家上市公司面板数据实证检验表明:总体上行政型治理程度与公司绩效呈负向关系,但在我国特定的制度转型背景下,独立董事比例、两职合一状况指标背后有多重影响因素,在多重力量作用下,合力方向及其显著性并不凸显。The reform process of china's enterprises is a transforming process from administrative governance to economic governance, which characterizes the weakening of the administrative governance and strengthening of economic governance. In this paper, the author makes five specific propositions, which focus on the main characters of the administrative governance,namely the administrative character in resource allocation, goals of operation as well as personnel appointment. Specifically, by examining the panel data of the 1187 listed company in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges during 2006-2008, the author finds that the level of administrative governance is negative related to those companies" economic performance generally. Under china's specific background of institutional transition, some indexes, such as the ratio of dependent director and CEO/Chair duality, are outcomes with mixed effects, and the direction and significance are not evident.
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