垂直整合对下游企业创新动机的影响  

The Effect of Vertical Integration on the Downstream Corporation's Innovation Incentive

作　　者：吴刚[1,2] 李传昭[1] 吴丙山[1] 

机构地区：[1]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆400030 [2]重庆西南大学经济管理学院,重庆400715

出　　处：《管理工程学报》2010年第2期89-93,共5页Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management

基　　金：国家社会科学基金资助项目(06CJY023)

摘　　要：本文研究一个上游垄断企业和两个下游企业所组成的系统中,制造商如何通过创新提高最终产品的差异性,来应对此市场中可能形成的垂直整合以及市场排斥的威胁。研究结果表明,在面临垂直整合及市场排斥威胁时,企业进行研发投资的动机包括消除市场排斥效应;迫使垂直整合企业降低中间产品的价格以及获得更高的利润。并且,在不同的垂直整合成本下,由研发投资获得的产品差异性会影响市场中垂直整合发生的可能性。This paper mainly studies how the manufacture has enlarged the differentiation of products by innovation in order to deal with the potential threat caused by the vertical integration and market foreclosure in the economics system which consists of the upstream monopolistic corporations and two downstream ones.It has been proved by all the findings that,confronting the threat of vertical integration and market foreclosure,corporations are motivated to take two actions： eliminate market foreclosure with RD investment and try to obtain more profit by forcing the integration firms to reduce the input price.On the other hand,the different and new products achieved from RD investment will also influence the possibility for vertical integration to take place.

关 键 词：垂直整合 市场排斥 研发投资 产品差异性 

分 类 号：F270[经济管理—企业管理]