机会窗口、逆向选择成本与股权融资偏好  

On the Window of Opportunity,Adverse Selection Cost and Equity Financing Preference

作　　者：束景虹[1] 

机构地区：[1]对外经济贸易大学经贸学院,北京100029

出　　处：《金融研究》2010年第4期72-84,共13页Journal of Financial Research

基　　金：对外经贸大学"211"三期重点学科建设项目(项目编号:73200013)资助

摘　　要：我国上市公司存在比较强烈的股权融资偏好,但仅仅存在于股票市场高估的时期。本文从市场非理性的角度构建了基于"机会窗口"的上市公司股权融资偏好模型,并认为股权融资偏好的根本原因在于股票价格的高估,逆向选择成本不能阻止上市公司的股权融资偏好。实证研究表明利用"机会窗口"再融资的公司无论是公司质量还是融资后的表现都明显低于其它时期再融资的公司,这损害了流通股股东的利益。证券监管部门在股权融资上的择时行为是导致股权融资偏好长期存在的一个重要原因。因此,在股票市场繁荣的时候有必要加强对上市公司再融资的监管。而从长远看,增加股票市场的有效供给和建设有竞争性的发行市场是解决股权融资偏好的有效路径。There is a stronger equity financing preference in listed companies during the period of stock market overvalued. The paper, based on the ＂window of opportunity＂, builds up an equity financing preference model from a view of non-rational market. The results show that that overvalued stock prices is the basic reason of eq- uity financing preference, and the cost of adverse selection can not stop the financing preference shares of listed companies. Meanwhile, the firms that issue seasoned equity under the ＂window of opportunity＂, no matter their quality and post-issue performance, are significantly lower than other refinancing firms in different periods, which damage the interests of circulating shareholders. Therefore, the author suggests that SEC should restrict firms from taking window opportunity and in the long run, a more competitive primary market and adequate stock supply would help eliminate equity financing preference.

关 键 词：股权融资偏好 机会窗口 逆向选择成本 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理]