上市公司恶意再融资行为研究——基于对投资者的问卷调查分析  

Research on Malicious Refinancing Behavior of Listed Companies——Based on the Investigation to Investors

作　　者：黎精明[1,2] 田笑丰[1,2] 高峻[1] 

机构地区：[1]武汉科技大学管理学院,湖北武汉430081 [2]中南财经政法大学会计学院,湖北武汉430073

出　　处：《经济管理》2010年第6期135-145,共11页Business and Management Journal ( BMJ )

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究基金项目"我国上市公司恶意再融资研究"(08JC630061)

摘　　要：恶意再融资是近年中国资本市场发展过程中的焦点议题,现有相关研究主要囿于监管者视角,鲜见基于投资者视角所做的研究。本文针对上市公司恶意再融资表现形式及其相对重要性,对中部四省投资者做了较大规模的问卷调查。以此为基础,本文归纳出了上市公司再融资恶意的12种主要表现形式,发现"上市公司在再融资计划推出前1年给高管发放巨额薪酬"等6种行为是典型恶意行为。进一步地,本文研究认为,上市公司恶意再融资是在多层委托代理关系导致企业内外治理机制不完善的背景下,相关利益主体寻租活动的"理性"选择;现有的再融资审核监管程序对抑制上市公司恶意再融资行为作用有限;虽然恶意再融资行为对公司业绩具有负面影响,但在再融资监管不到位的情况下,受短期利益诱惑,上市公司仍热衷于恶意再融资。In recent years, malicious refinancing of listed companies is the focus issue during the development of capital markets, however, the present corresponding researches are limited to the perspectives of the supervision, and almost there aren＇ t any researches from the perspectives of the investors. The paper made a larger scale survey to in- vestors of Chinese center four provinces, and it Aimed at getting well know the forms of malicious refinancing and their relative importance. Based on above survey, the paper concluded 12 kind of major malicious refinancing forms of listed companies, and found that there are six kinds of forms within them, such as paying huge salaries to the exec- utives within one year before issuing the refinancing plan, were the typical manifestation of malicious behaviors. Fur- ther, the paper believed that, under the circumstance of inadequate corporate governance mechanism brought out by the multi-agency relationships, malicious refinancing of listed companies is the rational choice of rent-seeking activi- ties of the main stakeholders; the present supervision and management measures had only played a limited role to constraint the malicious refinancing behavior of listed companies; although the malicious refinancing behavior has negative impact on corporate expected performance, but under the circumstance of weak refinancing supervision, tempted by the short-term interests, Chinese listed companies are still keen to perform malicious refinancing.

关 键 词：上市公司 恶意再融资 恶意形式 融资行为 融资动机 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理]