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作 者:李培勤[1]
出 处:《工业工程与管理》2010年第3期13-18,25,共7页Industrial Engineering and Management
基 金:国家自然科学基金资助项目(70772065);国家自然科学基金资助项目(70732003)
摘 要:电子商务的普及推动了供应链上零售商渠道和制造商直销渠道并存模式的发展。随着电子商务实施程度的增大,考虑顾客服务水平存在差异时,借助博弈论工具探讨"一对二"供应链上的强势零售商、弱势零售商和制造商的竞争特性,包括服务水平差异、电子商务实施程度的变化对竞争结果的影响等,并推出制造商开辟网络直销渠道的条件。得出结论是,不开辟网上直销渠道时,强弱势零售商的服务水平差别越大,则强势零售商的销售价格越高,市场份额越大;弱势零售商的销售价格越低,批发价格越低,市场份额越小。开辟网络直销渠道时,随着电子商务实施程度增大,制造商网上直销的市场价格逐渐减小,弱势零售商的批发价格逐渐减小,且制造商的网上直销价格与弱势零售商的服务水平无关等。The development of electronic commerce brings both retailer channel and internet direct channel exist at the same time.As implementation degree of electronic commerce increasing,this paper analyses the channel competition among large retailer,small retailer and the manufacturer in "One-to-Two" supply chain with different customer service level by game theory,which include customer service level and implementation degree of electronic commerce's effects.It concludes that,when manufacturer doesn't build internet direct channel,the customer service level is more different,the price of large retailer is higher,so does its market share.At the same time,the price of the small retailer is cheaper,so do its wholesale price and its market share.When manufacturer build internet direct channel,as implementation degree of electronic commerce increasing,the internet direct channel price of manufacturer becomes cheaper,so does small retailer's price.Besides,the internet direct channel price of manufacturer has nothing to do with the small retailer's customer service level,etc.
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