股权结构、资产质量与关联担保-来自中国A股上市公司的经验证据  

OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE, ASSET QUALITY, AND RELATED-PARTY LOAN GUARANTEES EVIDENCE FROM CHINESE A-SHARE LISTED COMPANIES

作　　者：唐松[1] 周国良[1] 于旭辉[1] 孙铮[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海财经大学会计学院,200433

出　　处：《中国会计与财务研究》2008年第2期62-113,共52页China Accounting and Finance Review

基　　金：本论文得到上海证券交易所“上证联合研究计划课题”的资助,也是国家自然科学基金项目（批准号70473055）和教育部人文社科研究基地重大项目（批准号05JJD630027）以及国家社会科学基金项目（批准号08BJY021）的阶段性成果.感谢两位匿名审稿人、执行编辑陈世敏教授和吴东辉博士提出的建设性修改意见.感谢上海证券交易所卢雄鹰高级经理、王建春博士以及上海国家会计学院刘凤委博士对本文的帮助和建议.当然,文责自负.

摘　　要：上市公司对外担保一直是我国证券市场上各方关注的一个焦点问题。基于控制权私人收益理论，本文认为关联方担保是控股股东继资金占用、关联交易之后进一步掏空上市公司的行为。通过对上市公司2003和2004两年的经验数据进行实证分析发现，上市公司提供关联担保的概率和数额与第一大股东的持股比例显著负相关，与是否集团所属显著正相关，与资产质量显著负相关。在考虑融资环境约束的情况下，上述关系仍然成立。同时，市场对关联担保公告做出了显著为负的反应。本文首次系统地提供了控股股东以担保的形式掏空上市公司的经验证据。The loan guarantees provided by listed companies for external firms have been a focus of concern by all parties involved in the Chinese securities market. Based on the theory of the private benefits of control, we think that related-party loan guarantees are a kind of tunnelling behaviour by controlling shareholders to further tunnel resources from listed firms, in addition to related-party transactions and embezzlement. Empirical evidence from 2003 and 2004 indicates that the possibility and magnitude of related-party loan guarantees are significantly and negatively related to the proportion of shares held by the controlling shareholders, positively related to whether the listed companies are controlled by corporation groups, and significantly and negatively panies. These relations still hold even after related to the asset quality of the listed cornconsidering the constraints of the financing environment. The results also show that market returns are negative when a related-party loan guarantee is announced. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study that systematically provides empirical evidence for the tunnelling behaviour of controlling shareholders via loan guarantees.

关 键 词：关联担保 股权结构 资产质量 掏空 

分 类 号：F279.246[经济管理—企业管理]