自我决定与道德责任  

Self-determination and Moral Responsibility

作　　者：徐向东[1] 

机构地区：[1]洛阳师范学院政法学院

出　　处：《哲学研究》2010年第6期99-106,共8页Philosophical Research

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地北京大学外国哲学研究所项目“自由意志与道德责任问题研究”(编号08JJD720040)阶段性成果的一部分

摘　　要：According to some ordinary understanding of moral responsibility, moral responsibility does really have a historical dimension:whether an agent can take responsibility for his action not only depends on whether he can have control of the action in performing it, but depends on the causal origins of the action also. Some theorists thus argue that moral responsibility does not only need to meet the condition of freedom, but must meet the alleged "condition of ultimate responsibility" too. However, if the latter condition implies that the agent must be able to take responsibility for the formation of his character or his self,then moral responsibility would be ultimately impossible, as Galen Strawson argues. This paper is devoted to examining Strawson’s argument for this claim, and trying to show why we need not accept his interpretation of this condition.According to some ordinary understanding of moral responsibility, moral responsibility does really have a historical dimension:whether an agent can take responsibility for his action not only depends on whether he can have control of the action in performing it, but depends on the causal origins of the action also. Some theorists thus argue that moral responsibility does not only need to meet the condition of freedom, but must meet the alleged 'condition of ultimate responsibility' too. However, if the latter condition implies that the agent must be able to take responsibility for the formation of his character or his self,then moral responsibility would be ultimately impossible, as Galen Strawson argues. This paper is devoted to examining Strawson’s argument for this claim, and trying to show why we need not accept his interpretation of this condition.

关 键 词：道德责任 自我决定 道德义务 自由选择 行为 实践 

分 类 号：B82[哲学宗教—伦理学]