行政型治理向经济型治理演进的经济学分析——基于国有企业利益相关者博弈的视角  

Economic Analysis in Evolving from Administrative Governance to Economic Governance——Based on Game Perspectives of State-owned Enterprises Stakeholder

作　　者：严继超[1] 程秀生[2] 

机构地区：[1]南开大学公司治理研究中心 [2]国务院发展研究中心

出　　处：《经济与管理研究》2010年第6期109-114,共6页Research on Economics and Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金重点项目"中国公司治理及其评价研究"(70532001)资助

摘　　要：在中国国有企业历史变迁的过程中,国有企业公司治理正沿着行政型治理向经济型治理的路径演进。本文通过对国有企业利益相关者的界定,运用经济学演化博弈的分析方法,构建了政府群体和员工群体演化博弈模型。由于政府群体学习速度可控性的存在,国有企业最终从行政型治理向经济型治理演化。According to historical changes of Chinese state - owned enterprises, this paper holds that corporate gov- ernance of state - owned enterprises is evolving from administrative governance to economic governance Through defining stakeholders in state- owned enterprises, the authors use evolutionary game theory to construct evolutionary game model between the government groups and employee groups. The reason of controllability of government learning speed results in governance evolving from administrative governance to economy governance

关 键 词：国有企业 行政型治理 经济型治理 演化博弈 政府群体学习速度可控性 

分 类 号：F276.6[经济管理—企业管理]