双重公司治理环境、政治联系偏好与公司绩效——基于中国民营上市公司治理转型的研究  

Dual Corporate Governance Environment, Political Connections Preference and Firm Performance——Study on Governance Transition of China’s Private Listed Firms

作　　者：李维安[1] 邱艾超[1] 古志辉[2] 

机构地区：[1]南开大学公司治理研究中心,天津300071 [2]南开大学现代管理研究所,天津300071

出　　处：《中国工业经济》2010年第6期85-95,共11页China Industrial Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金重点项目"中国公司治理及其评价研究"(批准号70532001);国家自然科学基金面上项目"不完全市场中的投资者福利问题研究"(批准号70802032)

摘　　要：本文首次从双重治理环境的角度实证研究了民营企业的政治联系程度对市场绩效的双重影响,并进而探讨了治理环境对该影响的协同作用。对具有政治联系公司分样本的进一步研究发现,PC指数与其市场绩效呈现左高右低的U型不对称曲线。即一方面因初期的政治选择导致内部效率损失,另一方面又借助联系的长期比较优势制衡政府干预。同时,具有政治联系的第一大股东持股比例、经济型治理环境能弱化政治联系的负效应,而行政型治理环境能加重负效应;双重治理环境本身对公司绩效存在差异性影响。建议民营企业逐步实现由政治联系"过度偏好"向与经济型治理的"互补效应"转型。This paper for the first time ever,empirically studies the double influence of political connections of private firms on market performance,from the double governance environment perspective.For the sub sample of politically connected firms,we find that the U curve between PCI and market performance.It shows that political connections have dual influence on market performance.On one hand,they could lead to the loss of internal efficiency;On the other hand,the firms could use the competitive advantages of connections to balance government intervention.Furthermore,the proportion of the first largest shareholder’ shareholding and economic governance environment could weaken the negative effect of political connections;However,the administration governance environment could aggravate the effect;The two governance environment brought double effect on firm performance.So,we suggest that the firms should accomplish the transition from the ＂excessive preference＂ for political connections to ＂complementary effect＂ with economic governance

关 键 词：双重公司治理环境 政治联系偏好 治理转型 行政型治理 

分 类 号：F276.6[经济管理—企业管理]