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机构地区:[1]东南大学集团经济与产业组织研究中心,南京210096
出 处:《管理科学学报》2010年第6期23-32,共10页Journal of Management Sciences in China
基 金:国家自然科学基金资助项目(70473013)
摘 要:数字电视产业中的接入服务/内容提供范式具有一种间接网络外部性,但是不同于硬件/软件范式,前者网络运营商处于核心地位,后者消费者是系统组装者.首先通过防降价均衡研究了用户数和频道商数外生情形下的网络运营商之间的价格竞争,然后基于纵向差异化模型研究了用户数和频道商数内生情形下的网络运营商之间的价格竞争.研究发现,在外生情形下,网络运营商定价对某市场份额的影响依赖于另一市场中的份额;在内生情形下,随着频道商多属度的增加,在上游市场中,高质量网络运营商和低质量网络运营商间的价格差距将逐渐加大;而在下游市场中,高质量网络运营商和低质量网络运营商间的价格差距将逐渐减小.The access service/channel provision paradigm in the digital TV industry has an indirect network effect, which is different from hardware/software paradigm frequently used in analysis of indirect network effect. The access service provider holds a core position in the first paradigm while consumers hold a core position in the second paradigm. The paper firstly analyses the price competition between oligopoly access providers using UPE ( Undercut-proof equilibrium) in a setting where the number of consumers and channel providers are exogenous. Then we analyze the price competition with vertical difference in a setting where the num- ber of consumers and channel providers are endogenous. The paper finds that under exogenous setting the price in one side of the market relies on its share in another market. Under the endogenous setting, with multi- homing by more channel providers, the price gap between high-quality access providers and low-quality access providers will increase in the upstream market while their price gap in the downstream market will decrease.
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