团队生产、集体声誉和分享规则  

Team Production,Collective Reputation and Sharing Rule

作　　者：李金波[1] 聂辉华[2] 沈吉[3] 

机构地区：[1]北京大学光华管理学院 [2]中国人民大学经济学院、企业与组织研究中心,100872 [3]美国耶鲁大学经济系

出　　处：《经济学（季刊）》2010年第2期941-960,共20页China Economic Quarterly

摘　　要：集体行动问题是契约与组织理论关注的核心主题,而＂搭便车＂或团队道德风险的存在使得这一问题难以得到令人满意的解决方案。本文为解决团队内部的道德风险难题提供了一种新的思路：一个团队为了向市场显示对自己有利的产出信号,会提供高于静态博弈的联合努力水平,从而形成一种集体声誉。这种集体声誉可以用于补贴团队内部由于＂搭便车＂造成的效率损失,从而缓解＂预算平衡约束＂和＂激励相容约束＂之间的矛盾。本文的分析表明,当集体声誉租金足够大时,通过适当的内部分享规则或者产权安排,不同类型的团队组合均可能实现一定程度的合作,从而缓解＂搭便车＂问题。Collective action is one of the core issues in the theory of contract and organization, but the problem of free-riding or moral hazard in team has no easy solution. This paper offers a new approach to solve the moral hazard problem in team. In order to send out a good signal in the market, a team will choose a higher level of joint effort than in a static game, which improves the collective reputation. The gain from the collective reputation reimburses the team for the efficient loss due to free-riding problem, and thus alleviates the conflict between balanced budget constraint and incentive compatibility constraint. This paper shows that when the rent from collective reputation is large enough, different kinds of teams may cooperate to some extent, as long as there is a proper interior sharing rule or ownership arrangement.

关 键 词：搭便车 团队生产 集体声誉 

分 类 号：F272[经济管理—企业管理]