价格激励行为下物流外包的信号博弈研究  

Signal Game Study in Outsourcing of Logistics Based on the Behavior of Price Incentive

作　　者：邱厌庆[1] 钟胜[1] 汪贤裕[1] 

机构地区：[1]四川大学工商管理学院,四川成都610064

出　　处：《华东经济管理》2010年第7期123-126,共4页East China Economic Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(70873086)

摘　　要：将价格激励行为引入到第三方物流的选择中,利用著名的"二手车"单价模型,分析物流提供商如何制定价格激励政策,促使物流外包企业制定有利于其收益的外包价格,以及在第三方物流的价格激励政策下,物流外包企业如何制定最优外包价格,使第三方物流在满足自身激励约束前提下,选择对外包企业最有利的行动,最大化外包企业的期望效用。Based on the behavior of price incentive,this paper analyzes the choice of third-party logistics,using the famous game model of ＂second-hand bicycles＂ to provide a price incentive policy for logistics supplyer.This policy can promote the logistics outsourcing company making a valuable outsourcing price.And based on this promotion,the logistics outsourcing company can provide an optimal price to affect the behavior of the third-party logistics under the constraint of its incentives,and maxize the expected utility of the outsourcing company.

关 键 词：价格激励 第三方物流选择 信号博弈 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]