视频游戏产业中垄断平台定价策略  

Pricing strategies of a monopoly platform in the video game industry

作　　者：李明志[1] 谭丝竹[1] 刘启[1] 

机构地区：[1]清华大学经济管理学院经济系,北京100084

出　　处：《清华大学学报（自然科学版）》2010年第6期957-960,共4页Journal of Tsinghua University(Science and Technology)

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70672007;70621061;70890082);教育部人文社科重点研究基地重大项目(06JJD630014;08JJD630001)

摘　　要：为分析视频游戏平台的定价策略问题,基于Hagiu的研究,建立了包含承诺的双边平台两阶段博弈模型,探讨了垄断平台不承诺与承诺情形下最优定价策略的区别。分析表明,在平台不承诺的情况下,如果核心使用者和轻度使用者差异较大,或是核心使用者比例较大,平台会选择吸引全部游戏软件开发商和核心使用者,游戏软件开发商和核心使用者的利润均为零,平台获得全部生产者剩余和进入平台的所有消费者剩余;在平台选择承诺的情况下,结论类似,但其利润要高于不承诺时的情形。A two-side platform two-stage game model was developed based on the research of Hagiu to analyze a monopoly platform pricing strategy in the video game industry.The differences between the platform＇s optimal pricing strategies were analyzed for the committed and not committed cases.The results show that the platform will try to attract all the game developers and core users when the platform does not commit and that there is a large difference between the core users and the light users with a high core user fraction.The profits of game developers and core users become zero when the platform provider acquires all the producers＇ surplus and the surplus users who have entered the market.The profit is higher and the pricing strategy remains the same when the platform chooses to commit.

关 键 词：价格结构 视频游戏 承诺 垄断平台 双边 

分 类 号：F062.9[经济管理—政治经济学]