基于控制权的创业企业最优融资契约模型  

A Control-Right-Based Model of Venture Companies' Optimal Financing Contracts

作　　者：钟田丽[1] 刘起贵[1] 孟晞[1] 

机构地区：[1]东北大学工商管理学院,辽宁沈阳110004

出　　处：《东北大学学报（自然科学版）》2010年第7期1050-1053,共4页Journal of Northeastern University(Natural Science)

基　　金：辽宁省社会科学规划基金资助项目(L08DJY095);教育部博士点科学研究基金资助项目(20090042110033)

摘　　要：将非货币性收益、企业家的努力、投资者控制权实现度与控制权实施成本作为影响创业企业最优融资契约的主要因素,以此构建创业企业最优融资契约分析模型.探讨了控制权安排对创业企业融资结构的影响,为提高创业企业融资效率得出有益的建议与启示.结果表明:一个较完善的融资市场、破产机制以及投资者控制权实施的保障体系对于提高创业企业融资效率至关重要;发挥控制权对于融资契约的作用,必须采取措施降低企业家的单位非货币性收益以及投资者的控制权实施成本,提高投资者的控制权实现度与企业资产的担保价值.An analytic model of optimal financing contract was developed for venture companies, which takes the non-currency earnings, entrepreneurial spirit, realizability of investor＇ s control right and its realizing cost as the main influencing factors on the optimal financing contract of a venture company. The influence of the disposition of control right on the financing structure of a venture company was discussed so as to propose the possible measures to take for improving its financing efficiency. The results showed that an effective financial market, bankrupt mechanism and guarantee system to ensure the control right of investors are crucial to the financing efficiency. To play the role of the control right on financial contracting, the following measures are advised to take, i.e., reduce the non-currency earnings of entrepreneur and the control right realizing cost of investors, and enhance the realizability of investors＇ control right and the guaranteed value of company assets.

关 键 词：创业企业 最优融资契约 剩余控制权 非货币性收益 企业家 

分 类 号：F276.3[经济管理—企业管理]