支持、掏空与中小股东利益保护——基于控制权价值的视角  

Propping,Tunneling and the Protection of Small Shareholder's Benefits Based on the Value of Control

作　　者：刘茂平[1] 

机构地区：[1]广东技术师范学院会计学院,广东广州510665

出　　处：《延安大学学报（社会科学版）》2010年第4期50-56,共7页Journal of Yan'an University (Social Sciences Edition)

摘　　要：大股东在公司治理中表现出支持与掏空两种不同的作用,分别对应着两种不同收益:控制权收益和超控制权收益。控制权收益作为对大股东对支持公司发展所作贡献的一种补偿,而超控制权收益则代表侵害所得。在降低大股东侵害所得的内部和外部公司治理机制中,包含法律在内的外部治理机制所起的作用更为显著。The large shareholders show two different roles such as propping and tunneling in corporate governance, corresponding to two different benefits： Benefits of Control （BC） and Excessive Benefits of Control （EBC）. BC should be viewed as the compensation for the contribution of large shareholders, and EBC represents the expropriation. The effects of external governance including the legal environment in reducing the expropriation of the internal and external corporate governance mechanisms are more significant.

关 键 词：大股东 支持 掏空 控制权收益 超控制权收益 

分 类 号：F270[经济管理—企业管理]