专利保护不完善市场的创新产品专利许可定价  

The Patent Licensing Pricing Model for the Innovation Products in the Imperfect Market for Patent Protection

作　　者：徐珊[1] 胡振华[1] 刘笃池[1] 

机构地区：[1]中南大学商学院,湖南长沙410083

出　　处：《系统工程》2010年第6期76-81,共6页Systems Engineering

摘　　要：将产品市场区分为专利保护完善市场与专利保护不完善市场,基于自主创新企业与后进企业市场地位不等的前提,建立了创新企业在面对后进企业可能通过仿制进入市场时的专利许可定价模型,并通过比较不同情形下两企业的利润得到创新企业的专利许可定价区间。分析指出,当处于专利保护完善的市场中,创新企业对专利许可费率的定价若满足某一特定范围,则能促使两企业都愿意以费率许可的方式生产,从而形成合作博弈,实现市场总利润最优;当专利保护不完善时,创新企业可以通过对专利许可费率或固定费用的合理定价,避免后进企业仿制的发生,并且当新产品市场利润足够大时,给予后进企业一定补贴来促使其放弃仿制也是值得的。Based on the different status in the market of the independent innovation enterprises and the ex post entrants,the product market is divided into perfect and imperfect markets of patent protection in this paper.Then the patent licensing pricing models are established in which innovation enterprises will be confronted with the possibility that ex post entrants will enter markets by imitation.By comparing the different profits of the two kinds of enterprise in different conditions,the pricing range of the patent licensing is obtained.Analysis result shows：（1） that in a perfect market of patent protection,if the innovation enterprises meet some particular range of the pricing rate of patent licensing,these two kinds of enterprises are willing to produce by means of a royalty which will form a collaborative game to achieve the optimum of the total profits in the market;（2） that while in the imperfect market of patent protection,the innovation enterprises can also prevent the ex post entrants from imitating by controlling the price of license royalty or fixed fees.Besides,it＇s worthwhile for the innovation enterprises to give subsidies to the ex post entrants so that they can quit imitation.

关 键 词：专利许可 定价 博弈论 自主创新 模仿 

分 类 号：F272[经济管理—企业管理]