基于委托-代理模型的国有煤炭企业经理人激励机制分析  

Analysis of Incentive Mechanism of State-owned Coal Enterprise Manager Based on the Principal-agent Model

作　　者：伍京华[1] 卢文光[2] 

机构地区：[1]中国矿业大学管理学院,北京100083 [2]北京工业大学耿丹学院,北京101301

出　　处：《北京工业大学学报（社会科学版）》2010年第4期23-27,共5页Journal of Beijing University of Technology (Social Sciences Edition)

基　　金：中央高校基本科研业务费资助项目

摘　　要：运用委托-代理理论,对国有煤炭企业的委托-代理关系进行了分析,提出了相应模型,根据对该模型解的分析和讨论,揭示了模型中各变量之间的关系,在此基础上提出相应对策。认为要建立相应的较为有效的国有煤炭企业经理人激励机制,必须同步推进构建相应的法制基础等多项举措的创新,为国有煤炭企业经理人的激励机制设计提供参考依据。State-owned coal enterprises are one of the lifeline of our national economy. Incentive mechanism of manager is the core of guaranteeing its work with high efficiency and in good order.The relevant model is given through the analysis of the principal-agent relation of the state-owned coal enterprises with the principal-agent theory.The analysis and discussion of the solution of this model reveals the relations of all variables in this model and some relevant countermeasures are also given,indicating that at the same time of building relevant and more effective incentive mechanism of the state-owned coal enterprise manager,the innovations of a lot of measures such as building relevant legal basis have to be advanced.The countermeasures maybe are helpful for the design of the incentive mechanism of the state-owned coal enterprise manager.

关 键 词：委托代理 国有煤炭企业 激励机制 

分 类 号：F062.5[经济管理—政治经济学] F416.21