损失厌恶下的供应链收益共享契约研究  

Revenue sharing analysis of supply chain with loss aversion

作　　者：林志炳[1] 蔡晨[2] 许保光[2] 

机构地区：[1]福州大学管理学院,福州350108 [2]中国科学院科技政策与管理科学研究所,北京100190

出　　处：《管理科学学报》2010年第8期33-41,共9页Journal of Management Sciences in China

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70371059)

摘　　要：在决策主体是损失厌恶的假设条件下,研究了离散供应链系统中的最优订购策略,揭示了损失厌恶特性对零售商最优订货量的影响;同时还分析了收益共享契约参数及决策者目标函数之间的关系,发现收益共享契约在损失厌恶下与风险中性情况下的差异;并且结合数值分析方法,对存在差异的原因进行了探讨,研究的结果为决策者在供应链管理过程中的决策提供了参考.Under the assumption that the decision agents are loss aversion, this paper studies the optimal order strategy in the decentralized supply chain model, and discovers the influence of the loss aversion on the optireal order quantity of retailers ; this paper also analyzes the relation between the revenue sharing contracts ＇ parameters and objective functions of decision agents, and find that there exists difference between the revenue sharing contracts with loss aversion agents and the revenue sharing contracts with risk neutral agents. A numerical analysis is employed to find the reason of the difference. These results can be used for the reference of the supply chain agents when they make decisions.

关 键 词：损失厌恶 供应链 收益共享 最优订货量 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]