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机构地区:[1]天津大学管理学院,天津300072 [2]天津财经大学数学系,天津300222
出 处:《中国管理科学》2010年第4期79-85,共7页Chinese Journal of Management Science
基 金:国家自然科学基金资助项目(70771073;70771071)
摘 要:为研究影响供应链成员讨价还价能力的诸因素以及它们起作用的内在机制,建立了供应链上下游之间考虑退出威胁的讨价还价博弈模型,模型的均衡解揭示了转换成本对供应链成员策略形成机制的影响;同时通过对讨价还价能力的数学定义,结合模型分析得出供应链成员的讨价还价能力是其转换成本的减函数,并进一步指出市场份额、信息量、学习能力和忍耐度等因素影响供应链成员讨价还价能力的内在机制。To study the influencing factors of bargaining power of supply chain members and the effect mechanism, we have established a game model between the upstream and downstream members of a supply chain under the threat of exit. The equilibrium solution of the model reveals the influence of switching cost to the strategy choice of supply chain members. At the same time, through the model conclusion and the mathematical definition of bargaining power, we conclude that the bargaining power of supply chain members is a decreasing functionof their switching cost. Futhermore, we present the internal mechanism of the effect of marker share, information, study ability and degrees of tolerance on the bargaining power of supply chain members.
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