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机构地区:[1]华北电力大学经济与管理学院,北京市昌平区102206 [2]北京京煤集团,北京市门头沟区102300
出 处:《电网技术》2010年第9期122-126,共5页Power System Technology
基 金:国家社会科学基金项目(06BJY025)~~
摘 要:电力行业是信息不对称的,需要设计有效的市场机制来激励发电商披露真实成本信息,避免或减轻发电商利用市场力操纵市场的行为。提出从激励效果指标化的角度来分析发电商竞价阶段市场机制的合理性。从市场机制设计的目标出发,构建了发电商竞价行为激励效果评价指标体系,提出了基于模糊C均值聚类法的激励效果评估模型。算例分析结果证明了该激励机制的合理性,表明该方法是有效的,易于操作和使用。Due to information asymmetry of power sector, it is necessary to design an effective market mechanism to incite gencos to disclose the information of their real costs to avoid or mitigate the behavior by which they rig the market by market power. In this paper, it is proposed to analyze the rationality of market mechanism in the gencos' bidding stage. Stating from the objective of market mechanism design, an index system to evaluate the incetive effect of gencos' bidding behavior, and an evaluation model of incentive effect based on fuuzy C-mean clustering is proposed. Results of calculation expample show that the proposed incentive mechanism is rational, and the proposed method is effective, convienent to operate and utilize.
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