供应商-销售商联合促销报酬契约设计  

Compensate Contract Design of Supplier-retailer's Coordinative Sale Promotion

作　　者：吴刚[1,2] 李传昭[1] 吴丙山[1] 

机构地区：[1]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆400030 [2]重庆西南大学经济管理学院,重庆400715

出　　处：《管理工程学报》2010年第3期132-135,共4页Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management

基　　金：国家社会科学基金资助项目(06CJY023);西南大学农村经济与管理研究中心重点资助项目(08jwsk281);西南大学经济管理学院学术团队建设工程(供应链物流管理与市场营销耦合研究)共同资助项目

摘　　要：在双边道德风险模型下,研究了供应链中联合产品促销的报酬契约设计。无道德风险条件下,供应商及销售商双方努力水平总是高于存在道德风险条件下双方的努力水平。同时,在道德风险条件下的报酬契约设计中,以供应商给予销售商的产品批发价格来实现双方收益的转移,根据可以观测的产品最终市场需求,从供应商视角出发,构造了双边道德风险下最优的报酬契约,契约中,双方最优的边际利润分配之比为各自的努力效率之比。Within the framework of double moral hazard, the design of compensate contract of coordinative sale promotion in supply chain has been studied. When there is no moral hazard, Supplier and retailer＇s effort always more than there is moral hazard. Simultaneity when designing the compensate contract, through a wholesale price, the contract realize transfer of some product revenue between the supplier and retailer. According to ultimate market demand of product what we can see, we constructed optimal compensate contract within double moral hazard form the supplier. In this contract, the optimal rate of both sides magrginal profit is the rate of each effort efficiency.

关 键 词：联合促销 充分信息 双边道德风险 报酬契约 

分 类 号：F224.13[经济管理—国民经济]