考虑投标费用的联合体工程总承包商收益分配  

Study on Profit Distribution in an Alliance General Contractor with Bidding Cost Considered

作　　者：管百海[1] 

机构地区：[1]中铁八局集团有限公司,四川成都610036

出　　处：《工业工程》2010年第4期18-22,共5页Industrial Engineering Journal

基　　金：教育部高等学校博士点专项基金资助项目(20060613019)

摘　　要：为探讨前期投标费用对联合体工程总承包商收益分配的影响,以合约理论和博弈思想为基础,建立联合体工程总承包商的相关收益模型。对模型进行求解,并以变化的具体数据作为算例进行检验,结果表明项目前期投标费用如何在联合体成员之间进行分配不影响以后项目实施过程中项目优化设计的实现程度、项目总承包收益在联合体成员之间的最优分配比例,以及联合体成员各自可采取的进行项目优化设计的最优努力程度;同时,前期投标费用在联合体双方成员之间的合理分配比例与联合体成员单位知识投入的成本系数、效率系数以及项目总承包收益在联合体成员间的分配比例3个因素相关。To get a project,there is pre-bidding cost that should be considered in the profit distribution among the members in an alliance general contractor.Based on contract and game theories,a mathematical model is present to describe the profit distribution problem in an alliance general contractor.With this model,analysis is carried out.It is shown that the sharing of the pre-bidding cost has no effect on the quality of completing the project and the distribution of total profit.However,to make the sharing of the pre-bidding cost proper,the cost coefficient,efficiency coefficient of knowledge investment,and the distribution proportion of the total profit should be taken into account.An example is presented to demonstrate the proposed method.

关 键 词：联合体 投标费用 收益分配 费用分摊 

分 类 号：F062.4[经济管理—政治经济学]