检索规则说明:AND代表“并且”;OR代表“或者”;NOT代表“不包含”;(注意必须大写,运算符两边需空一格)
检 索 范 例 :范例一: (K=图书馆学 OR K=情报学) AND A=范并思 范例二:J=计算机应用与软件 AND (U=C++ OR U=Basic) NOT M=Visual
出 处:《商业研究》2010年第9期54-58,共5页Commercial Research
摘 要:在信息不对称和契约不完备的情况下,自利管理者与股东之间的利益冲突,引发管理者固守职位并最大化自身效用的管理防御行为。通过选择管理者年龄、管理者任期、管理者学历、管理者持股比例和管理者薪酬等特征变量,选取2003-2008年间6年连续上市的A股上市公司面板数据,从管理防御视角考察管理者特征与公司业绩的相关性。研究表明管理者年龄、管理者学历和管理者薪酬与公司业绩显著正相关,管理者任期与业绩显著负相关,管理者持股对业绩有负面影响。In the information asymmetry and incomplete contracts case, manager-shareholder interest conflict leads to managerial entrenchment behavior,which is that managers stick to their own positions and maximize the effectiveness of their own. Based on managerial entrenchment perspective, this paper selects 5 manager-feature variables of age, tenure, education, ownership and compensation, and uses panel data of A-share companies which listed six consecutive years between 2003 and 2008 to examine the relationship between manager characteristics and corporate performance. The study finds that company performance positively associates with manager age, education and compensation, while managerial tenure and ownership have negative impact on performance.
正在载入数据...
正在载入数据...
正在载入数据...
正在载入数据...
正在载入数据...
正在载入数据...
正在载入数据...
正在链接到云南高校图书馆文献保障联盟下载...
云南高校图书馆联盟文献共享服务平台 版权所有©
您的IP:216.73.216.222