中国地方财税竞争与异质偏好劳动力的空间流动——以京津冀大都市区为例  

Local Tax Competition and Spatial Mobility of Labor with Heterogeneous Preferences in China:Evidence from Metropolitan Areas of Beijing,Tianjin and Hebei

作　　者：陆军[1] 杨志勇[1] 

机构地区：[1]北京大学政府管理学院,北京100871

出　　处：《财经研究》2010年第9期4-14,共11页Journal of Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目(07CJY024);北京市哲学社会科学"十一五"规划项目(06BaZH020)

摘　　要：文章通过对Hindriks、Rochet和Stole(2002)模型的拓展,将劳动力流动引入含有空间属性的区域财税竞争框架,研究异质性偏好的劳动力的空间流动决策,及其对地方税收竞争一般均衡的影响。文章解析了地方政府效用最大化的税收和支出组合条件、"罗尔斯式"政府效用与线性政府效用函数下均衡解的影响因素,以及均衡时要素流动性对地方政府效用和地方福利分配的政策影响。研究发现,劳动力流动与地方政府的政策集合、政府效用之间存在相互的决定和影响关系。在罗尔斯式的政府效用设定下,博弈均衡仅与技术工人的流动性有关,但地方再分配的程度与技术工人的流动性成反比。Based on the model of Hindriks,Rochet and Stole, the paper introduces labor mobility into the frame of local tax competition with spatial attribute,and studies the spatial mobility decision-making of labor with heterogeneous preferences and its influences on local tax competition. It also analyzes the combination of tax and fiscal expenditure for the utility maximization of local governments, factors influencing the equilibrium under Rawlsian-and-quasi-linear government utility functions,and the effect of factor mobility on local government utility and local welfare allocation in equilibrium. The results show that labor mobility relates closely to the policy set of local governments and government utility. Under the hypothesis of Rawlsian government utility, game equilibrium is only relevant to the mobility of skilled workers,but the degree of local redistribution is negatively related to the mobility of skilled workers.

关 键 词：税收竞争 劳动力流动 异质性 再分配 

分 类 号：F127[经济管理—世界经济] F240