上市公司高管股权激励所得税规定与激励效用冲突分析  

The Conflicts between Income Tax Regulations of Executive Equity Incentives and Incentive Effect

作　　者：娄贺统[1] 郑慧莲[1] 张海平[1] 吕长江[1] 

机构地区：[1]复旦大学管理学院,上海200433

出　　处：《财经研究》2010年第9期37-47,共11页Journal of Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70872022;70632002);教育部人文社会科学规划基金资助项目(06JA630016);上海市哲学社会科学基金资助项目(2008BJB021)

摘　　要：文章通过对比分析中美两国公司高管股权激励所得税制度差异,发现中国的所得税规定与股权激励制度的激励效果存在冲突,主要表现为:按工资薪金所得纳税,其超额累进税制导致的高边际税率会影响股权激励效用的发挥;在行权日纳税,过重的税收负担会削弱高管实施股权激励制度的积极性,或迫使高管立即抛售股票来缴税,还容易引发高管的机会主义行为;在行权日纳税还导致股权激励收益与税基不匹配。文章针对我国股权激励税收制度中存在的问题提出相应的建议,以期为进一步完善我国上市公司股权激励税收制度提供参考。The realization of the expected aim of equity incentive system is closely related to national tax policies. Through the comparative analysis of income tax regulations of executive equity incentives in China and USA, the paper arrives at the conclusion that there are conflicts between income tax system and equity incentive effect in China. The main conflicts are as follows： firstly, the high marginal tax rate caused by progressive tax system according to the tax category of wages and salaries will curb the equity incentive effect; secondly, paying tax on exercise day will increase executives＇ tax burden, leading to their lack of enthusiasm for implementing equity incentive system or instant selling of the exercised stock to collect money for tax-paying, and the opportunistic behavior of executives will be apt to occur; thirdly, the returns of equity incentives do not match the tax base if tax is paid on exercise day. The paper provides some suggestions about the further perfection of tax regulations of equity incentives in China.

关 键 词：股权激励 税收安排 利益冲突 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理] F810.42[经济管理—国民经济]