简化固定值掩码二阶差分功耗攻击方法及其防御措施  

Second-order Differential Attacking Method of Simple Fixed-value Masking and its Defense Measures

作　　者：李浪[1,2] 李仁发[2] 吴克寿[3] 

机构地区：[1]衡阳师范学院计算机系,湖南衡阳421008 [2]湖南大学计算机与通信学院,湖南长沙410082 [3]厦门理工学院计算机系,福建厦门361024

出　　处：《小型微型计算机系统》2010年第9期1894-1898,共5页Journal of Chinese Computer Systems

基　　金：国家"八六三"高技术研究发展计划基金项目(2007AA01Z104)资助;国家自然科学基金项目(60903203)资助;湖南省科技计划项目(2009GK3023)资助

摘　　要：功耗攻击是近年来嵌入式加密芯片安全的重要威胁之一,它以较低的代价和很快的速度破解未加防护的加密芯片.简化固定值掩码由于所需消耗资源少,特别适合低功耗小面积要求的智能卡,本文对简化固定值掩码的二种实现方法中一种进行了深入研究与分析,通过理论和实验证明简化固定值掩码采用相同字节方法并不能抗二阶功耗攻击.提出一种改进的部分随机固定值掩码算法,理论和实验证明可以抗二阶差分功耗攻击,与上述简化固定值掩码算法相比:本算法在保持简化固定值掩码算法优点的基础上,可以抗二阶差分功耗攻击.Power analysis attacks are one of the biggest threat to embedded encryption chip during the last years,it can break password of the encryption chip protection with lower cost and higher speed.In this paper,the simple fixed-value masking is analyzed in-depth which was proposed by Hwang Chang.The corresponding formal theory of power analysis attacks are designed,which proved that the simple fixed-value masking can not resist second-order difference power analysis by experimental and theoretical evidence.On this basis,an improved fixed-value masking algorithms are designed which can resist second-order differential power attacks.

关 键 词：简化固定值掩码 二阶差分功耗攻击(SO-DPA) AES 防御 

分 类 号：TP309[自动化与计算机技术—计算机系统结构]