经理自主权与R&D投入的相关性检验——来自中国证券市场的经验证据  

A Test on the Correlation Between Managerial Discretion and R&D Investment——Empirical Evidence from Chinese Securities Market

作　　者：苏文兵[1] 李心合[1] 徐东辉[2] 许佳[1] 

机构地区：[1]南京大学商学院,南京210093 [2]中信建投证券有限责任公司,深圳518010

出　　处：《研究与发展管理》2010年第4期30-38,共9页R&D Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70572049)

摘　　要：以中国上市公司为对象,研究了经理自主权对企业R&D投入的影响.研究发现,我国经理自主权总体上对企业R&D投入强度有显著的正向影响,其中以董事长与总经理"二职兼任"为特征的经理职位权和以营运资金或自由现金流为特征的经理运作权均与R&D投入强度显著正相关,但以高管薪酬差异为特征的经理薪酬权与R&D投入的关系不明显.另外,R&D强度还与总经理持股比例、资产负债率、是否为高科技行业以及第一大股东是否为国有股或国有法人股显著正相关,与企业规模呈显著的倒U型关系,但与股权集中度、经理变更、资产收益率、年份的关系不明显.It studies the influence of managerial discretion on R＆D investment in Chinese listed firms. Managerial discretion has three components： ledpower, characterized by general manager served as board chairman concurrently, and opepower, featured by operation capital and cash flow, and paypower, expressed by managerial payment differences. It finds that managerial discretion as a whole has significant positive influence on R＆D investment. Both ledpower and opepower have significant positive effect on R＆D investment while the effect of paypower is not significant. It also re- veals that R＆D investment is positively related to the managerial ownership, finance lever rate, high-tech industry and the largest shareholder. The relationship between R＆D investment and enterprise size exhibits a significant reverse U relation, while there is no significant relationship between R＆D investment and the variables of ownership concentration, change of general manager, ROA and sample year.

关 键 词：经理自主权 职位权 薪酬权 运作权 R&D 

分 类 号：F276.6[经济管理—企业管理]