对博弈论公设的质疑  

Doubt on Public Pre-assumptions in Game Theory

作　　者：蒋正峰[1,2] 

机构地区：[1]华南师范大学政治与行政学院,广州510631 [2]华南农业大学思政部,广州510642

出　　处：《天津商业大学学报》2010年第5期37-39,共3页Journal of Tianjin University of Commerce

基　　金：国家社会科学基金"经济逻辑研究"(06BZX050)

摘　　要："理性人"和公共知识是博弈论中的两个公设,即假设博弈局中人都是理性的,在公共知识的背景下选取行为策略,使自己的效用达到最大化。然而,正是从这样的假设前提出发,却使博弈理性推理陷入困境,"理性人"不理性。因此,符合逻辑的是对博弈论公设产生质疑。＂Rational agent＂ and common knowledge are two public pre-assumptions in game theory, which assume that players in game are rational, and choose action strategy against a background of common knowledge to maximize utility. However, it consequentially puts rational reasoning in a dilemma, and ＂rational agent＂ is reasonless. Logically, what we can do is to throw doubt on public pre-assumptions in game theory.

关 键 词：理性 公共知识 集体理性 个体理性 

分 类 号：B81[哲学宗教—逻辑学]