成本收益差异的房地产不对称双头期权博弈模型分析  

Option Game Model Analysis of Asymmetric Duopoly on Real Estate Projects with Different Costs and Profits

作　　者：刘向华[1] 

机构地区：[1]中南财经政法大学新华金融保险学院,湖北武汉430073

出　　处：《华东经济管理》2010年第10期156-160,共5页East China Economic Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70801063);中南财经政法大学引进人才启动资金项目(90407005105)

摘　　要：文章运用不对称双寡头期权博弈模型考察在房地产开发项目中企业的策略投资决策。模型中,房地产开发企业的项目投资有固定的建设周期,项目产生现金流是在建成以后;并且,投资具有投资成本先动优势和投资收益后动优势,即追随企业的投资成本和租金流均高于领先企业。分析表明,建设周期、投资成本、投资成本先动优势、垄断投资收益、后动投资收益、商品房市场需求波动度等因素都影响企业的投资决策。存在投资成本差异的阈值,将两企业均衡投资策略划分为先占均衡、序列均衡和等待均衡。Using asymmetric duopoly option-game model,the developers＇ strategic investment decisions in real estate projects are examined.In the model,the project has constant time to build,and the profit flow is made after the project has been completed.Moreover,the developer has first-mover advantage on investment costs and second-mover advantage on investment incomes,that is,the follower has higher costs and profits.The analysis shows that the time to build,investment costs,first-mover advantage on investment costs,monopoly profits,second-mover profits and market demand volatility influence the decisions of the developers.There is the critical level of first-mover advantage on investment costs,which divides the equilibrium into preemptive investment,sequential investment and waiting.

关 键 词：实物期权 期权博弈 双头垄断 房地产投资 

分 类 号：F270[经济管理—企业管理]